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We present a set of simple techniques for key establishment over
a radio link in peer-to-peer networks. Our approach is based on
the Diffie-Hellman key agreement protocol, which is known to be
vulnerable to the “man-in-the-middle” attack if the two users in-
volved in the protocol do not share any authenticated information
about each other (e.g., public keys, certificates, passwords, shared
keys, etc.) prior to the protocol execution. In this paper, we solve
the problem by leveraging on the natural ability of users to authen-
ticate each other by visual and verbal contact. We propose three
techniques. The first is based on visual comparison of short strings,
the second on distance bounding, and the third on integrity codes;
in each case, the users do not need to enter any password or other
data, nor do they need physical or infrared connectivity between
their devices. We base our analysis on a well-established method-
ology that leads us to a rigorous modularization and a thorough
robustness proof of our proposal.
Keywords—Diffie–Hellman (DH) protocol, key agreement proto-
cols, man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks, message authenticators,
security, wireless networks.
I. INTRODUCTION
As the popularity of mobile systems such as PDAs, lap-
tops, and mobile phones increases every day, users tend to
rely more on them in a growing number of situations. In this
paper, we focus on the frequent case in which two people get
together (e.g., at a meeting, or in the street) and make use of
their devices to communicate with each other, or at least to
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exchange their (electronic) business cards. Clearly, the com-
munication between these devices must be properly secured.
Very often, the two users will want the security between
their devices to be peer-to-peer, thus operating independently
from any authority. In practice, this means that the mobile
devices must run a protocol to authenticate each other and
to protect the data they exchange (to ensure confidentiality
and integrity); the latter operation typically requires setting
up a symmetric shared key. This key can be used to secure
both immediate communications and communications that
take place afterwards (e.g., when users exchange e-mail over
the Internet).
It is a common belief that peer-to-peer security is more
difficult to achieve than traditional security based on a
central authority; moreover, wireless communication and
mobility are considered to be at odds with security. Indeed,
jamming or eavesdropping is easier on a wireless link than
on a wired one, notably because such mischief can be
perpetrated without physical access or contact; likewise, a
mobile device is more vulnerable to impersonation and to
denial-of-service attacks.
In contrast to this widespread belief, we think that phys-
ical presence is the best way to increase mutual trust and to
exchange information in a secure way. Indeed, authentica-
tion is straightforward, as users can visually recognize each
other (if they meet for the first time, they can be introduced
to each other by a common friend whom they trust, or they
can check each other’s ID). In order to establish a shared key,
they can make use of a location limited channel (e.g., phys-
ical contact or infrared [1], [2]) between their two devices.
The man-in-the-middle (MITM) attack is considered to be
infeasible in these conditions.
Recently, researchers have proposed solutions that run
exclusively on a radio link (hence they do not require a
special channel such as physical contact or infrared), which
increases usability. To compensate for the much higher
vulnerability of radio channels, in some solutions users are
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required to type a password in both devices [3]; in other
solutions, they simply have to compare strings of words (the
longer the string, the higher the security) [3]–[5].
In this work, we build on our previous results (see [5]) and
propose three approaches to the problem of user-friendly
key agreement (and mutual authentication) in settings where
the users do not share any authenticated information in ad-
vance. The first approach belongs to the family of solutions
requiring the users to compare strings of words, whereas
the other two approaches are completely novel; they are
based on radio-channel specific techniques, namely, dis-
tance-bounding and integrity-codes (I-codes). In addition,
we make the following contributions: 1) we design protocols
that are provably secure in a realistic communication model;
2) we apply a modular approach to designing and analyzing
the protocols, thus paving the way to the design of reusable
(provably secure) message transfer (MT) authenticators; and
3) we significantly increase user-friendliness.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section II we state
the problem and formulate our assumptions. In Section III
we present our protocols. In Section IV we provide a security
analysis of our protocols. In Section V we survey the related
work. Finally, we conclude the paper in Section VI.
II. PROBLEM STATEMENT AND ASSUMPTIONS
We consider the following problem. Two users, each
equipped with a personal device capable of communicating
over a radio link, get together and want to establish a shared
key. Although they can visually recognize each other, we as-
sume that they do not share any authenticated cryptographic
information (e.g., public keys or a shared secret) prior to this
meeting. In addition, the users can communicate only over a
radio channel (no infrared or physical ports are available).
The challenge is the following: How can the users establish
a shared key in a secure way?
A. Threats Against Radio-Based Systems
The Diffie–Hellman (DH) key agreement protocol [6]
seems to be appropriate for the problem (and the set of
assumptions) at hand; the DH key agreement protocol is
believed to be secure against a passive adversary1 (e.g.,
eavesdropping on a wireless link). Let us briefly review
how the DH key agreement protocol works. To agree on
a shared key, two users, Alice and Bob proceed
as follows. picks a random secret exponent and
calculates the DH public parameter , where is a
generator of a group of large order. does the same; that
is, he calculates . Finally, and exchange the public
parameters and and calculate the shared DH key
as .
It is well known that the basic version of the protocol is
vulnerable to an active adversary who uses an MITM attack.
At first glance, it may seem that mounting the MITM at-
tack against wireless devices that communicate over a radio
link and are located within the radio-communication range
1This is true if the Computational DH problem [7] is intractable.
of each other can be perpetrated only by a sophisticated at-
tacker. But this is not the case, as we will now explain by a
simple example in the framework of Internet protocols.
The Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) [8] is used by the
IP to map IP network addresses to the hardware addresses
used by a data link protocol. An attacker can send spoofed
ARP replies to the victim, who will consequently send all
its packets to the attacking machine. In an experiment we
conducted, we were able to redirect the traffic between two
“legal” machines through an attacking machine, despite the
fact that the two legal machines were in radio-communica-
tion range of each other. In this way, the attacker could perpe-
trate the MITM attack (by altering the DH parameters). For
this attack we used a collection of publicly available tools for
network auditing and penetration testing, called dsniff [9].
Of course, ARP spoofing is not the only way to mount an
MITM attack against wireless devices. Examples of more in-
volved MITM attacks against Bluetooth [10] equipped de-
vices can be found in [11] and [12].
Hence, our goal is to devise mechanisms that prevent the
attacker from modifying the DH parameters without being
noticed.
B. Assumptions
We assume the users to be equipped with a computation-
ally constrained personal device (e.g., a PDA). Each device
is equipped with a radio transceiver (e.g., IEEE 802.11 [13]).
We also assume that each device has a human-friendly inter-
face (i.e., a screen and a keyboard).
In this paper, we will present our solution over the mul-
tiplicative group with the generator . Here, we take
to be a subgroup of of the prime order , where is
the multiplicative group of nonzero integers modulo a large
prime . However, the whole treatment here applies to any
group in which the Decisional DH (DDH) problem is hard.
These are all groups in which it is infeasible to distinguish be-
tween quadruples of the form and quadruples
where are random exponents. Further-
more, we assume that and a generator of ,
are selected and published. All devices are preloaded
with these values.2
Concerning the adversarial model, we adopt the
Dolev–Yao threat model [7]. Thus, we assume that the
attacker Mallory controls the radio-communication
channel; he can obtain any message transmitted over the
radio channel. can initiate a conversation with any
other user. However, we assume to be computationally
bounded. We further assume that the two parties involved in
the communication do trust each other; otherwise, little can
be done (a corrupted party can always disclose any secret
information received by another party). Whenever we speak
of the security of a given protocol, we implicitly assume that
the users involved in the protocol (e.g., their devices) are not
compromised.
2We stress here that we could let users select and communicate to each
other their own parameters p and g. However, this would come at the expense
of the number (and size) of messages to be exchanged between the users, and
our goal is to keep key exchange protocols as simple as possible.
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C. Commitment Schemes
Commitment schemes are an important cryptographic
building block that we will be using in our protocols. In
this subsection, we provide only an informal treatment of
commitment schemes. The semantics of a commitment
scheme are the following: 1) a user who commits to a certain
value cannot change this value afterwards (we say that the
scheme is binding) and 2) the commitment is hidden from its
receiver until the sender “opens” it (we say that the scheme
is hiding).
A commitment scheme transforms a value into a com-
mitment/opening pair , where reveals no information
about , but together reveal , and it is infeasible to
find such that reveals . Now, if Alice wants
to commit a value to Bob, she first generates the commit-
ment/opening pair commit , and sends to
Bob. To open , Alice simply sends (and if necessary)
to Bob, who runs open ; we denote with the
message at the receiver’s side when message is sent over
a public (unauthentic) channel. If the employed commitment
scheme is “correct,” at the end of the protocol we must have
. In our security analysis, we assume the usage of an
ideal commitment scheme. We are now ready to describe our
protocols.
III. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS
The common characteristic of the three protocols that we
propose in this section is that they all aim at ensuring the
integrity of DH public parameters , rather than
the integrity of the agreed key . An important advantage
of such an approach is based on the following observation:
people build trust in each other when they meet in person; se-
cure communication is usually needed after their first phys-
ical meeting (typically over the Internet). Clearly, in such a
scenario, it is not necessary to compute the shared DH key
immediately. This “expensive” computation (a modular ex-
ponentiation) can be postponed to some later time, when (re-
mote) secure communication is needed. As a consequence,
if the solution to the problem of integrity checking of DH
public parameters is not too computationally demanding, the
process of integrity checking can be carried out on compu-
tationally constrained devices. This is very important, since,
when on the move, people are often equipped with only this
kind of devices (e.g., mobile phones, PDAs).
A. DH Key Agreement Based on Short String Comparison
(DH-SC)
The simplest way to check the validity of the exchanged
DH public parameters for Alice and Bob is to report
the exchanged public parameters and to each other
and then perform a comparison of them. The comparison of
the exchanged values can be performed by looking at the
screen of the communicating party or by reading aloud the
values to be compared. Although this approach provides very
strong security, it is clearly impractical because it requires
and to compare rather large streams of digits. A possible
way to make visual (and verbal) verification easier for and
is to represent the DH public parameters in a more readable
form by, for example, significantly reducing the number of
digits to be compared (and potentially encoding the bits in a
more readable form as in RFC 2289 [14]). However, in this
way, many different (long) DH public parameters translate to
the same (short) bit string (the check value). This may give
some advantage to a potential attacker.
Another simple approach consists in first exchanging
and over a public channel and, in turn, verifying (for
example, visually) that matches ,
where is a hash function satisfying certain security prop-
erties and “ ” denotes a concatenation. In order for this ap-
proach to be usable, the output of the hash function should
be truncated to a relatively short length (e.g., around 50 bits).
With this approach, an adversary is successful if he can find
values and such that ; an adver-
sary can find a collision on the truncated output of . Note
that it is not sufficient for an adversary to find any collision
on . On the contrary, the adversary is not constrained to
finding a second preimage3 for a single fixed image value
or ; an adversary controls inputs to through the
values and . Furthermore, the outcome of the used hash
function is truncated (e.g., 50 bits long). Therefore, even if
is a second preimage resistant hash function, this still
may not be a sufficient guarantee that the adversary cannot
find a collision between truncated and .
In Section V, we will describe a similar problem with an ap-
proach proposed by [15], where the users compare the trun-
cated output of a hash function applied to the shared key
.
In order to make the approach based on string compar-
ison usable, it is essential to make a proper tradeoff between
security and usability. We propose a provably secure pro-
tocol, called the DH key agreement with string comparison
(DH-SC), that achieves optimal tradeoff between security
and usability.
The protocol unfolds as shown in Fig. 1; we note here
that this is an optimized version of the protocol that we pro-
posed in [5] (some credit for this optimization goes to Serge
Vaudenay). Both Alice and Bob have selected their
secret exponents and , respectively, randomly from
the set ( being the order of ) and calcu-
lated DH public parameters and , respectively.
and proceed by generating -bit random strings and
, respectively. Finally, and calculate commitment/
opening pairs for the concatenations ID and
ID , respectively. Here, 0 and 1 are two public
(and fixed) values that are used to prevent a reflection attack
(Section IV-D). ID and ID are human readable identifiers
belonging to parties and (e.g., e-mail addresses).
The following four messages are exchanged over a radio
link. In the first message, sends to the commitment .
responds with his own commitment . In turn, sends
out , by which opens the commitment . checks
the correctness of the commitment/opening pair and
3For a given x, x is said to be a second preimage if x 6= x and h(x) =
h(x ) [7].
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Fig. 1. Operation of DH-SC.
verifies that 0 appears at the beginning of . If the verifi-
cation is successful, sends, in the fourth message, , by
which opens the commitment . in turn checks the
commitment and verifies that 1 appears at the beginning of
. If this verification is successful, and proceed to the
final phase (Fig. 1).
In the final phase, and first generate the verification
strings and , respectively, as shown in Fig. 1 ( is the
bitwise “XOR” operation). The length of each of these strings
is . Finally, Alice and Bob (as users) simply compare
and . If they match, Alice and Bob accept each other’s
DH public parameters and and the corresponding
identifiers ID and ID as being authentic. At this stage,
Alice and Bob can safely generate the corresponding secret
DH key .
We assess the security of our protocol in Section IV. Here,
we only state the result. To do this, we define formally what
we mean by a secure protocol.
Definition 1: We say that any protocol is
a secure protocol enabling authentication of DH public pa-
rameters between and if the (polynomial-time) attacker
cannot succeed in deceiving and into accepting DH
public parameters different than and , except with
a satisfactorily small probability .
To state the result about the security of DH-SC protocol,
we need two additional security parameters ( was already
introduced before: it is the length of verification strings
and ). We denote with the maximum number of ses-
sions (successful or abortive) of the DH-SC protocol that any
party can participate in. We further assume that there are
parties that are using the DH-SC protocol. The following re-
sult is proven under the assumption that an ideal commitment
scheme is used.
Theorem 1: The probability that an attacker succeeds
against the DH-SC protocol is bounded by . There-
fore, for the appropriately chosen parameter , DH-SC is
a secure protocol enabling authentication of DH public
parameters.
Remark 1: The probability of success by the attacker as
stated in Theorem 1, refers to the success against any one
among all DH-SC protocol runs (successful or abortive); in
other words, the attacker does not care which parties com-
munication he breaks/influences. On the contrary, the proba-
bility that the attacker is successful against a fixed (targeted)
party is only .
The proof is given in Section IV. Let us give an example of
possible values for the above parameters. Assume there are
at most parties using our protocol and each party
can participate in at most sessions (successful or
abortive) in its lifetime. Then, by choosing we ob-
tain that the highest probability of success by the attacker
(having seen a huge number of protocol runs)
is at most . Note that also represents the
length of the verification strings and to be compared
by users. To make this job easier for users, we can encode
bits into short words from some predefined dic-
tionary (e.g., RFC 2289 [14]). For example, in order to have
, where each word is four characters long, each user
would have to store a dictionary of
four-character words. It is clear that can be reduced fur-
ther by using larger dictionaries.
B. DH Key Agreement Based on Distance
Bounding (DH-DB)
In this section, we describe a key agreement protocol that
is based on verifiable principal proximity, achieved through
distance bounding. We call our protocol DH with distance
bounding (DH-DB). The protocol ensures the secure estab-
lishment of a shared key between two parties and if there
are no other parties that are closer to or to than they are to
each other. In this section, we assume that the pair of devices
have the means to accurately estimate the distance between
themselves (later in this section, we discuss the possible tech-
niques for this purpose).
The proximity check between the two devices is per-
formed through distance bounding [16]: each device
upper-bounds its distance to the device with which it is
agreeing on a key. The measured distance appears on both
device displays. The users then visually check whether there
are other users/devices closer to them than the displayed
distance bounds. If this is not the case, the exchanged
DH public parameters and the corresponding identities are
accepted.
The DH-DB protocol is shown in Fig. 2. Note that the
protocol in Fig. 2 is actually built upon the DH-SC protocol
(Fig. 1). The only difference is that the verification of the
authentication strings and (in the DH-DB protocol) is
performed through Brands and Chaum’s distance bounding
protocol [16]. Thus, Alice and Bob exchange the
commitment/opening pairs and in the first
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Fig. 2. Operation of the DH-DB.
four messages in exactly the same way as in DH-SC protocol.
Furthermore, and perform all necessary verifications
as in the DH-SC protocol. Finally, and calculate -bit
verification strings and . As we can see in Fig. 2, and
also exchange commitments and to concatenations
and ; again, 0 and 1 serve to protect against the
reflection attack.
Upon reception of the commitments and , the de-
vices execute distance bounding by exchanging bit by bit all
the bits of , , and as shown in Fig. 2. During
distance bounding, the devices measure round-trip times be-
tween sending a bit and receiving a response bit. The device
estimates the distance-bound to the other device by multi-
plying the round trip time by the speed of light in the case of
the radio or by the speed of sound in the case of ultrasound
communication.
Having exchanged , , and , and open
and by sending out and , which they then use to
retrieve and , respectively. and then use and
to retrieve and ; this is done by performing a series
of “XOR” operations as shown in Fig. 2. Finally, and
verify and against and ; note that this verification
is now done by the devices and , whereas in the DH-SC
protocol this comparison is performed by users and .
Having successfully verified against and against
, the devices and display the measured distance
bounds on their screens. The users and then visually
verify that there are no other users/devices in their vicinity
Fig. 3. Integrity region of usersA andB (d is the distance between users’
devices).
(in what we call the integrity region of and ; see Fig. 3).
If the displayed distance bound corresponds to the distance
to the closest device, the users accept the exchanged DH
public parameters and and the corresponding
identities and as being authentic; otherwise,
they reject them. This last step is important as it guarantees
that the exchanged messages in the protocol preserved their
integrity, meaning that they cannot have been maliciously
modified or generated by an adversary, but only by the
closest party.
1) Properties of DH-DB Protocol: In DH-DB, the MITM
attack is prevented by the proximity verification. We define
the integrity region of users and as the union of two
ˇCAGALJ et al.: KEY AGREEMENT IN PEER-TO-PEER WIRELESS NETWORKS 471
spheres each centered at the position of devices and
with radii equal to the distance between devices and
(see Fig. 3). If the users can visually verify that there are no
other users/devices within the integrity region and if the dis-
tance-bounding phase is secure, then the integrity of mes-
sages and is respected; i.e., and sent from and
will reach and , respectively, unchanged. Note here
that the security of the distance-bounding phase relies on the
fact that the attacker does not learn and/or until the
end of this phase; all that knows are commitments
and . Therefore, and guarantee to and that
the attacker cannot send the bits, in the distance-bounding
phase, earlier than receiving the previous bit; for this reason,
it cannot appear to be closer than it actually is.
If attacker is not within the integrity region, he will not
be able to send messages to such that it seems that it is
placed on the same (or shorter) distance from as . With
this, the integrity of and is preserved as if users and
exchanged and face to face (e.g., voice communi-
cation). Since and are actually authentication strings
from the DH-SC protocol, by verifying that and match,
users and are guaranteed that messages and are
authentic, except with a satisfactorily small probability (see
Theorem 1).
A nice property of this protocol is that it does not depend
on the power ranges of the devices, but solely on their prox-
imity . Specifically, the closer the parties are, the smaller
the integrity region is, and the harder it is for the adversary
to get into the region without being noticed by the honest
parties. For example, getting the devices as close as
cm should be a sufficient guarantee, even for the most de-
manding users, that no adversary (be it even a small device)
resides in the corresponding integrity region.
2) Implementation: We envision two possible implemen-
tations of DH-DB: with radio (RF) and with ultrasound (US).
Both exhibit equal security guarantees, but require different
equipment attached to the devices. We briefly report on how
these implementations have been addressed so far. Brands
and Chaum [16] propose a distance bounding protocol that
can be used to verify the proximity of two devices connected
by a radio link; it requires devices with a high (nanosecond)
precision-of-time measurement. To the best of our knowl-
edge, the only commercial technique that achieves such pre-
cision, and achieves therefore a high precision-of-distance
measurement, is ultrawide-band (UWB). In [17], Fontana
has demonstrated that with UWB, distances can be measured
with an error margin of up to 15 cm.
Sastry et al. [18] propose a distance bounding protocol
based on ultrasound and radio wireless communication (a
similar technique was also proposed by Waters and Felten
[19]). Ultrasound-based distance bounding requires only
millisecond time measurement precision, but of course it
needs each device to be able to communicate via ultra-
sound. Ultrasound-based distance bounding has centimeter
precision.
In both radio-frequency and ultrasound solutions, the re-
sponse time (the XOR operation and the reversion of the trans-
ceiver) of the challenged principal must be tightly bound and
predictable.
C. DH Key Agreement With Integrity Codes (DH-IC)
In this section, we propose a mechanism that reduces
the involvement of the users to a single press of a button.
This mechanism is based on what we term an integrity code
(I-code).
1) Concept of I-codes: I-codes are to be used with com-
munication media (channels) for which we can ensure that
it is not possible to block emitted signals without being de-
tected, except with a negligible probability.
Definition 2: An integrity code is a seven-tuple
, where the following conditions are
satisfied:
1) is the (finite) set of possible source states (messages
to be encoded by the I-code);
2) is the set of binary sequences with ones and
zeros;
3) is the set of source encoding rules ,
where is an injective function (hence
);
4) is the set consisting of two power levels 0 and with
, i.e., ;
5) is the channel modulation function satis-
fying the following rules: a) the symbol “1” is trans-
mitted using power level and b) the symbol “0” is
transmitted using power level 0.
Note from the above definition that the set consists
of -bit long codewords, each containing a uniquely ordered
sequence of symbols “1” and symbols “0.” Next, we
give a simple example.
Example 1: Suppose , , .
Then . Note that
. Suppose further the following source encoding
rule: , , , and
. In order to communicate, for example, the
source state “10” to a designated receiver, the transmitter
emits a signal described by the following sequence: .
This sequence is interpreted as follows: only during the pe-
riod of the second symbol does the sender emit some signal
(energy) over the used channel. An important condition for
I-codes to work properly is that it should not be possible
to block emitted signals without being detected. At the end
of this section, we discuss a possible strategy to ensure this
condition.
We next discuss some properties of I-codes. Let us first
introduce some additional notation. Let and denote
two threshold power levels with . Let denote
the duration of an I-code symbol transmission at the phys-
ical layer. We further denote with , the average
power received in the interval (of duration ) corresponding
to the th symbol in the communicated sequence of symbols.
We will assume for the moment that the users are synchro-
nized at the physical layer (in Section III-C3, we will discuss
how this can be achieved and address some other important
practical considerations). Now, let the following be the re-
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Fig. 4. DH-SC key agreement protocol enhanced with I-codes (DH-IC protocol).
ceiver’s demodulation strategy for a given symbol : 1)
if , output symbol “1”; 2) if , output
symbol “0”; and 3) if , output “Abort”
message.
Property 1: Assume that we can ensure , for
all corresponding to symbol “1,” except with a negligible
probability. Then, an adversary can neither add nor remove a
symbol “1” from the communicated sequence without being
detected.
In order to change the sequence being transmitted, an ad-
versary has to reposition at least one symbol “1” transmitted
by a legitimate party (due to the construction of I-codes; the
number of symbols “1” is fixed to ). This means that an ad-
versary has to add a new symbol “1,” as well as remove one
of the old symbols “1” from the communicated sequence of
symbols. However, according to the assumption in Property
1, an adversary cannot remove a symbol “1” without pro-
voking at least the “Abort” message by the receiver. There-
fore, any such attempt by the adversary will be detected.
To correctly apply I-codes, the sender has to make sure
that the following condition is met: The receiver is turned on
and is listening on the (correct) channel during the sender’s
transmission.
2) Application of I-codes to the DH-SC Protocol: The
application of I-codes to the DH-SC protocol is straightfor-
ward. The resulting protocol (DH-IC) is shown in Fig. 4. The
point to observe here is that we simply encode authentication
value and transmit it by using I-codes. The following the-
orem is an immediate consequence of Property 1.
Theorem 2: Assuming that the condition of Property 1 is
met, DH-IC is a secure protocol enabling the authentication
of the DH public parameters.
3) Some Practicalities: In this section we briefly discuss
the most important practical considerations around I-codes,
notably in order to show their feasibility.
Security of I-codes: The security of I-codes relies on
Property 1. Thus, if we can ensure that any symbol “1” cannot
be completely blocked (deleted, annihilated, canceled) once
transmitted over a public channel, except with a negligible
probability, then an adversary cannot change an “I-coded”
message without being detected. In other words, we need to
ensure that , for all corresponding to symbol “1.”
In the context of a radio channel, canceling a radio signal
in such a way that , where is set to the back-
ground noise level, entails sending out the inverted signal
that will have exactly the same characteristics (signal level,
phase) on the receiver’s side. Note that corresponds to
the average power received in the interval of duration . En-
suring that in this setting could be quite chal-
lenging to achieve for an adversary. Indeed, the goal of the
legitimate receiver is only to detect the presence of the signal
at any time during the period , not to completely recon-
struct the signal.
To further increase the robustness of I-codes, the trans-
mitter can have a large number of symbol “1” waveforms,
one of which the transmitter chooses randomly for each
symbol “1” transmitted. In this way, the attacker does not
know what waveform to try to cancel. At the same time,
the receiver only measures the energy he receives during
intervals of duration , and so any of the “1” waveforms
are equally good for this purpose. Note that the receiver does
not have to know which waveform the transmitter uses in a
given time interval.
Power levels: For the proper decoding of I-codes, the
users have to ensure that the the average power received by
a designated receiver during the period corresponding to
a symbol “1” is greater or equal to the threshold power level
(i.e., , for all corresponding to symbol “1”).
This condition can be satisfied with high probability by using
relatively high transmission powers and ensuring that the dis-
tance between the sender and the designated receiver is
relatively short.
Synchronization: The receiver has to know when it
should start demodulating the message being sent by the
transmitter. A possible solution is to use the convention that
every sequence of I-code symbols begins with symbol “1.”
Note further that the duration of each symbol is fixed to ,
which is a public value. For a relatively short message to be
encoded by I-codes (e.g., around 50 bits with the DH-SC
protocol enhanced with I-codes), we can afford the duration
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Fig. 5. Message authenticator based on short strings comparison (MTSC). Bob checks whether the source of the message m^ is Alice; an “authentic channel”
can be implemented through visual or vocal comparison of the output strings N  ^N and N  ^N .
of an I-code symbol to be as large as 1–10 ms. In
this case, the synchronization between the sender and the
designated receiver should not be a problem. It would then
take between 0.05 and 0.5 s to transfer 50 bits; which seems
acceptable, given that the secrecy of the communication is
at stake.
IV. SECURITY ANALYSIS—PROOF OF THEOREM 1
In this section, we analyze the security of our key agree-
ment protocols, primarily DH-SC protocol.
A. Overview of the Approach
For the analysis of our protocols, we use the modular ap-
proach proposed by Bellare et al. [20]. This approach as-
sumes two adversarial models: the authenticated link model
(AM) and the un-authenticated links model (UM). The AM
model is an ideal-world model in which the attacker is able to
invoke protocol runs, masquerade as protocol principals, and
find old session keys; however, he is not able to fabricate or
replay messages that appear to come from uncorrupted par-
ties. The UM model is a real-world model, in which the at-
tacker can do all that it can in the AM model; in addition, he
can replay messages and try to fabricate messages.
The security of the protocol is first proven in the AM
model, assuming (as assumed by the model itself) that all the
communication between the parties is authenticated. If the
protocol is proven to be secure in the AM model, then it can
be shown to be secure in the UM model, provided that each
message transmitted between the parties is authenticated
by a protocol called message transfer (MT) authenticator.
In [20], Bellare et al. show that the basic DH protocol is
secure in the AM model and that it is secure in the UM
model, provided that correct MT authenticators are used
to authenticate transfers of DH public parameters. In their
work, they use MT authenticators based on digital signatures
and encryption.
Since our DH-SC, DH-DB and DH-IC protocols are
all variants of the authenticated DH protocol (with
string-comparison-based, distance-bounding-based, and
integrity-code-based authentications, respectively), showing
that these protocols are secure simply requires showing that
their authenticators are secure. For the DH-SC protocol,
we will show the construction of the MT string-compar-
ison-based (MTSC) authenticator and provide a detailed
proof.
The MTSC authenticator is shown in Fig. 5. We ana-
lyze the security of the MTSC authenticator in the Bellare
and Rogaway communication model based on matching
conversations [21].
B. Matching Conversations
In this model, a protocol is executed by a pair of
parties , where is a set of parties that share
some common context (e.g., they all run a message authenti-
cation protocol). By we mean that a party attempts
to authenticate a message from party in a session that
believes has the session identifier . Here, by authenti-
cation of a message we mean that at the end of a successful
run of the protocol, party accepts that a message it has
received must have been sent by party , except with a neg-
ligible probability.
We consider an active attacker Mallory in the communi-
cation model of Bellare and Rogaway [21], meaning that
Mallory can observe, modify, and schedule communication
between a pair of parties . Given that Mallory is
a powerful attacker, we let Mallory interact with
and as oracles in a “black box” style, meaning that
Mallory can query by supplying with input queries
that comply to the observed authentication protocol. In
the response to any query, oracle outputs a message
that complies to the authentication protocol. We use the
following format to record all queries and
responses that sent out in the session that marks as
; we do “the same” for . Here, denotes a
conversation of , meaning a sequence of timely ordered
messages that has sent out and received. We say that
and have matching conversations, if for each
message sent out by in time , received the
same message in and if for each message sent
out by in time , received the same message
in [21]. Here, is, for some
positive integer , a time sequence recorded by and
when conversing.
Consider a pair of oracles and that belong to
party and party , respectively. Following the unfolding
of the protocol in Fig. 5, the conversations of and
can be written as follows:
(1)
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where means that a party receives/sends no message in
the corresponding time . We first observe that if the two
conversations are not modified by adversary , (and
hence ) will reach the “Accept” decision and
and will be matching. This is obvious because then
, (which implies ) and ,
and therefore matches , meaning that will
output “Accept” (Fig. 5). Moreover,
. This essentially means that party will believe that
the message was sent by party .
Definition 3: We say that is a secure authen-
tication protocol between and if attacker cannot win,
except with a satisfactorily small probability . Here,
wins if and reach the “Accept” decision while
they do not have matching conversations.
Observe that if any of , , or are missing,
and will simply “Abort” the protocol and ad-
versary will certainly fail to convince and to
“Accept.”
C. Security of the MTSC-Authenticator
We denote the MTSC authenticator as a protocol .
We observe a pair of parties running and
a powerful polynomially bounded active attacker Mallory.
We assume the adversary does not belong to the set ; this
is consistent with the model of Bellare and Rogaway [21] and
with the fact that any two parties and running
mutually trust each other.
In our security proof of , we consider the
commit function to be an ideal commitment. We fur-
ther assume that each party has access to a perfect random
number generator. Note that we will observe the security of
in the sense of Definition 3. Let be the maximum
number of sessions (successful or abortive) that any party
can participate in. We will assume that there are at most
parties using protocol . In our analysis, we will also
assume that each party participates in at most one message
authentication session at a time.
We show that for fixed , and , the probability that
oracle outputs “Accept” without a matching conversa-
tion is satisfactorily small. Note that if outputs “Ac-
cept” then there must exist some oracle (with party )
that outputs “Accept” too; message , at the end of protocol
, guarantees this. We first state the following intuitive
result.
Lemma 1: If adversary is to succeed against a pair of
oracles , then we must have , where is
the commitment sent out by and is the commitment
received by .
Proof: Claim: If and and both “Ac-
cept,” then and must have matching conversa-
tions. Indeed, cannot break the used ideal commitment
scheme, so we must have and hence and
. Furthermore, since and both “Ac-
cept,” we have and hence .
Moreover, . Therefore,
and have matching conversations.
If is to output “Accept,” then the pair has to be
a valid commit/opening pair. This is because cannot break
the used ideal commitment scheme; any attacking attempt
that involves breaking such a commitment scheme will fail
with probability 1. Furthermore, if oracle is to output
“Accept,” then there must exist some (with party )
that outputs such that .
Note here that and are potentially chosen by the
adversary .
Consider now the interaction between a pair of oracles
and adversary as given in (1). Assume that
is a valid commit/opening pair (i.e., does not try to
break the commitment scheme) and assume (Lemma
1). Note that if any of the two assumptions does not hold,
then certainly fails. Then, we have the following.
Lemma 2: For any such interaction between and
and adversary , we have
.
Proof: Observe that has to submit before actu-
ally seeing . This follows from the unfolding of
and the hiding property of the commitment scheme. Simi-
larly, has to submit (as a part of commitment ) be-
fore actually seeing . This follows from the unfolding of
and the binding property of the commitment scheme.
Thus, irrespectively of the attacking strategy taken by ,
one among and will certainly be disclosed as the last
value over an unauthentic channel. If it happens that both
and are disclosed at the same time, then we pick an ar-
bitrary one.
Assume that is disclosed as the closing value. Then,
we have
, that is, and are independent and
uniformly distributed random variables, and and are
both generated before . The same holds for as the
closing value. Therefore,
. Note that the assumption precludes from trivial
situations, where would not modify the messages, to take
place; in which case we would have
.
From Lemma 2, we conclude that the probability that
there exists oracle that belongs to party and that
“Accepts” without a matching conversation is at most 2
times the maximum number of interactions (successful or
abortive) that party has participated in. It is crucial that
we take abortive attempts into account, too, when evaluating
the probability that is successful against a given party.
This is because learns that his attempt is unsuccessful
(i.e., ) before potentially sends
out in an attempt to disclose to party . If is
not successful in a given attempt, he can simply abort the
protocol by simply not sending to .
Since we limit each party to participate in at most
successful or abortive runs of , the probability that
there exists oracle that belongs to party and that
“Accepts” without a matching conversation is at most .
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Note that party “Accepts” only if the corresponding party
“Accepts.” Therefore, the probability that there exists
oracle that belongs to party and that “Accepts”
without a matching conversation is at most . Finally,
the probability that any party is broken, assuming that there
are parties that use protocol , is at most .
D. From Secure MT-Authenticator to Secure
DH-SC Protocol
In the previous section, we have proved that MTSC emu-
lates the message transmission (MT) protocol in unauthen-
ticated networks (in the real world), meaning that if party
(and hence, party ) “Accept” at the end of the protocol
shown in Fig. 5, then knows that the message he received
was sent by (except with a probability ; for appro-
priately chosen , can be made satisfactorily small).
It is proven in [20] that the basic DH protocol is secure in
the AM model, assuming that the Decisional DH problem is
intractable. Now, to obtain a secure DH protocol in unauthen-
ticated networks (UM model), we simply apply the MTSC-
authenticator to each message of the basic DH protocol. By
doing this we obtain a DH protocol (DH-SC) that is secure in
the UM model (Theorem 3 in [20]). A naive application of the
MTSC-authenticator (Fig. 5) to the basic DH protocol results
in a protocol that involves six messages and two string com-
parisons. A simple way to improve on this is to piggyback
the messages of one MTSC-authenticator on the other as in
the DH-SC protocol (Fig. 1): in this case, the -bit random
string (sent through the commit/opening pair )
plays two roles: 1) the role of in the MTSC-authenticator
in Fig. 5 and 2) the role of in the MTSC-authenticator on
the same figure (in this case, Alice from Fig. 1 wants to make
sure that a message she received was sent by Bob). The first
role is clearly fulfilled. That in Fig. 1 also fulfills the
second role follows from the fact that in Fig. 1 remains
hidden until Alice opens by sending out and Alice
sends out only after receiving . The same analysis is
valid for Bob from Fig. 1.
It is important to note that with the above optimization
of both MT-message authenticators, we introduce a vulner-
ability to the reflection attack [7] in the DH-SC protocol
(Fig. 1). For example, can simply reflect all the messages
he receives back to the messages’ originators. Note that in
this case . This is why we append
two public (fixed) values 0 and 1 to messages and ,
respectively, and impose the verification of both at the end of
the protocol in Fig. 1. Note that after having thwarted the re-
flection attack, the DH-SC protocol can be seen as two runs
of the MTSC-authenticator (Fig. 5). With this, we conclude
the proof of Theorem 1.
V. RELATED WORK
The problem of key establishment is a very active area
of research. Stajano and Anderson propose the resurrecting
duckling security policy model, [1] and [22], in which key
establishment is based on the physical contact between com-
municating parties (their PDAs). A physical contact acts as a
location limited channel, which can be used to transmit a key
(or a secret) in plaintext. Thus, no cryptography is required
at this stage. The potential drawback of this approach is that
the realization of a physical contact can be cumbersome with
bulky devices (e.g., laptops).
An approach inspired by the resurrecting duckling secu-
rity policy model is proposed by Balfanz et al. [2]. In this
work, the authors go one step further and relax the require-
ment that the location limited channel has to be secure against
passive eavesdropping; they introduce the notion of a lo-
cation-limited channel (e.g., an infrared link). A location-
limited channel is used to exchange preauthentication data
and should be resistant to active attacks (e.g., MITM). Once
preauthentication data are exchanged over a location-limited
channel, users switch to a common radio channel and run
any standard key exchange protocol over it. Possible candi-
dates for a location-limited channel include physical contact,
infrared, and sound (ultrasound) [2]. Here again, the disad-
vantage of this approach is that it may be a cumbersome to
realize a link with bulky devices (e.g., laptops) in the case
of infrared or physical contact. In addition, the infrared link
itself is not well studied in the context of secure communica-
tions. Actually, our DH-SC protocol could be applied to the
infrared link as well.
Asokan and Ginzboorg propose another solution based on
a shared password [23]. They consider the problem of set-
ting up a session key between a group of people (i.e., their
computers) who get together in a meeting room and who
share no prior context. It is assumed that they do not have
access to public key infrastructure or third party key man-
agement services. The proposed solution is the following. A
fresh password is chosen and shared among those present in
the room (e.g., by writing it on a sheet of paper or a black-
board). The shared password is then used to derive a strong
shared session key. This approach requires users to type the
chosen password into their personal devices.
It is well known that IT security systems are only as se-
cure as their weakest link. In most IT systems the weakest
links are the users themselves. People are slow and unreliable
when dealing with meaningless strings, and they have diffi-
culties remembering strong passwords. In [24], Perrig and
Song suggest using hash visualization to improve the secu-
rity of such systems. Hash visualization is a technique that re-
places meaningless strings with structured images. However,
having to compare complex images can be cumbersome.
In [15], Maher presents several methods to verify DH
public parameters exchanged between users. The first
method described in [15] is the most relevant one for the
problem we consider in this paper; other methods are based
on certificates and/or shared secrets. Thus, and first
perform the DH key exchange protocol and in turn report
to each other values and , where and
are the shared DH keys as computed by and ,
respectively, and is a compression function (i.e., maps
a key to four-digit hex vectors [15]). Unfortunately, this
technique has a flaw, which was discovered by Jakobsson
[25]. The problem with Maher’s technique is the following.
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An attacker Mallory , who knows and controls all the
communication, first generates his secret exponents and
and the corresponding public parameters and .
Since knows that and will compare and
, he checks if . If this is
the case, sends instead of to , and instead
of to . If , generates new
values for and and repeats the above procedure.
Since outputs a very short string (four-digit hex vector
[15]), will find a collision after a relatively low number
of attempts.
Motivated by the flaw in [15], Jakobsson [25] and Larsson
[26] proposed two solutions. However, both solutions are
based on a temporary secret shared between the two users
(thus, for example, SHAKE stands for Shared key Authen-
ticated Key Exchange). In our paper, we consider the same
problem but in a more demanding setting, as we assume that
the users share no secret key prior to the key exchange.
Dohrmann and Ellison [27] propose a method for key ver-
ification that is similar to our approach; this method is based
on converting key hashes to readable words or to an appro-
priate graphical representation. However, it seems that users
are required to compare a substantial number of words (or
graphical objects); this task could take them as much as 24 s,
according to [27]. This time is significantly reduced when the
graphical representation is used. However, Dohrmann and
Ellison provide no security analysis of their approach.
In [3] and [28], Gehrmann et al. propose a set of techniques
to enable wireless devices to authenticate one another via an
insecure wireless channel with the aid of the manual transfer
of data between the devices. The protocol, which they call
MANA II, is similar to our DH-SC protocol; in both proto-
cols the parties have to compare the output of their devices.
The MANA II protocol is based on authentication codes. At
the end of the protocol, the parties have to compare a key
and a check value, where only the check value contributes to
the uncertainty of the attacker. As a result, with MANA II the
number of bits to be compared by the parties is twice as much
as with our DH-SC. Other mechanisms proposed by [3] and
[28] basically require the users to type in given values into
their devices. The important difference between MANA II
and our DH-SC protocol is that MANA II requires the parties
to compare two strings (a key and a check value), whereas
only one string (the check value) contributes to the uncer-
tainty of the attacker. As a result, for a fixed security level,
MANA II requires the parties to compare twice as many bits
as in the case of the DH-SC protocol.
We should mention other key-exchange protocols, pro-
posed primarily for the use in the Internet: IKE [29], JFK
[30], and SIGMA [31]. All these protocols involve authenti-
cation by means of digital signatures, which clearly does not
fit the problem we study here. We also should mention the
work of Corner and Noble [32], who consider the problem
of transient authentication between a user and his device, as
well as the work of ˇCapkun et al. [33], where the authors
show how to make use of users mobility to bootstrap secure
communication in open ad hoc networks.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have provided three solutions to the fun-
damental problem of key agreement over a radio link. As
user-friendliness is extremely important for the acceptance
of any security scheme, we have minimized the burden on
the user: there is no need of physical contact, nor of infrared
communication between the devices.
To our best knowledge, the two last proposals (based on
distance bounding and on I-codes) are new. Likewise, the
security analysis of the first proposal (based on the compar-
ison of short strings) and the MT-authenticator based on short
string verification are also new.
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